SiPearl: the story of a European processor designed with the world

The first two weeks of June had something quite special. Many meetings, exchanges, topics open at the same time. Two events particularly marked me: the OW2con'26, to which I have already devoted an article, and the public shooting of a special episode of À la French.

The OW2con'26 had already allowed me to measure how the European open source is not just a matter of specialists. There were developers, companies, public actors, communities, but also a question that came up constantly: **how to get these subjects out of technical circles to**

make them understandable, desirable and useful to the greatest number?

A few days later, the À **la French** evening extended this impression. In another setting, with another energy, but with the same idea: **something is happening around digital sovereignty. Discussions are becoming more concrete. People talk to each other. Worlds cross.**

Of all these meetings, four of them particularly impressed me.
First there was **Virgil Deville**, a manager produced around Docs de LaSuite numérique carried by DINUM. Then **Sylvain Zimmer**, also at DINUM, committed in particular to La Suite territorial pour l'ANCT, and at the origin of the **MaSuite.fr** project.

There was also **Thierry Lelégard**, security architect at **SiPearl**, who was kind enough to answer my first questions during this evening, then to accept an interview of more than an hour and a half around SiPearl, processors and digital sovereignty.

That evening, Thierry Lelégard did not come empty-handed. He had with him the first processor model produced by SiPearl: **Rhea1**Rhea1. Seeing this object, even without being an engineer, had something very concrete. Digital sovereignty, all of a sudden, was no longer limited to a word, a doctrine, a political intention or a debate of experts. **She also held in a flea**.

And then there was another meeting, for a weekend: **Markus Feilner**.



Markus is a German specialist in Linux and free software. He has been working in the open source ecosystem since 1994. He was an IT consultant, head of documentation at SUSE, technical journalist, including as deputy editor for Linux-Magazin and Heise iX. Since 2000, he has also been the director of **Feilner IT**, a consulting structure specialized in open source strategies, documentation, training and support for organizations.

He regularly acts as an author, speaker, facilitator and analyst on the issues of free software, technological sovereignty and digital transformation. He is also associated with **grommunio**, where he is billed as an open source ambassador, with work focused on free alternatives to proprietary collaborative solutions.

We talked a lot over the weekend. Really a lot. We wanted to remake the world, as it sometimes happens when two people share a concern, a curiosity and a certain impatience. **Above all, we tried to understand why open source and digital sovereignty could no longer be content to exist in speeches.**

Our provisional conclusion was in an idea: the technical debates between experts remain essential, but **they are no longer sufficient**. **Another step is opening, that of the story**. That of the ability to **unite beyond the already convinced communities**. To explain again, to popularize more, to demonstrate concretely, to **tell the successes**, to make it understood that these topics are not only about developers, CIOs or administrations, **but also citizens**.

We had this strange impression that the moment was no longer just for reflection, **but for the passage to action**. A breach had opened. It had to be seized **NOW** or, to say it with a little less solemnity: **by waiting for the perfect moment, we often end up watching others write history for us**.

A friendship was born. The days and weeks that followed, our exchanges continued. Almost daily. A form of intellectual boiling that has not really stopped since.

And to get back to SiPearl, I sent an email to Thierry Lelégard to ask him for an interview. He responded favorably almost immediately. I warned Markus. We were excited like kids. This subject attracted us all the more because it touched on a part of the digital sovereignty that we knew less. Processors, semiconductors, design tools, foundries, global industrial chains: everyone knows that it is important, even vital. But these topics often remain addressed in the form of a slogan: *we must think about it; we must do it; we must catch up*. We talk about it much less in detail. We understand them even less.

I then asked Markus to send me three questions that I would ask Thierry Lelégard. Markus and I don’t have exactly the same way of looking at things, the same course, or the same look. He has been watching these issues from Germany. Me from France. Far from being an obstacle, this disparity feeds us on the contrary mutually: it avoids reducing digital sovereignty to a national reflex, and obliges to look at the subject on the scale where it really plays, that of Europe.

His three questions were as follows:

1. What is Germany’s role in this context and what impact can we expect, or hope for?
2. How do you see Germany? Are we agile enough? Should we, could we, do more? Germany has long been at the forefront of some technologies related to electronic chips and robotics.
   Is it still? Can she become a leader again? What should be done?
3. What are the crucial points to be taken into account in such an alliance, especially in terms of language and culture? Can we compare this project to an “Airbus of computing” or electronic chips? Are there any lessons to be learned from this comparison, particularly between France and Germany?

I asked these questions in my own way. I'm not a journalist, an engineer, or a technician, much less of the serail. I move forward with my words, my blind spots and my efforts of understanding.

Before entering into the detail of the interview with Thierry Lelégard, it is also necessary to tell how this meeting was made possible. It is thanks to **Steeve** Morin: entrepreneur and software engineer based in Paris. He is the founder and CEO of **ZML**, a company that develops next-generation **AI inference** technology, designed to improve model performance across different types of chips and hardware infrastructure.

Prior to ZML, he was Vice President of Engineering at Zenly, the French geolocation app acquired by Snap, where he led large-scale technical teams. His career also associates him with projects such as boot2docker and LegiGPT.

> Je ne suis pas avocat mais je connais 148191 articles de loi jusqu'au 17 Avril 2022.
>
> Pas mal non? C'est français.

Today, he regularly intervenes in the debates on AI, computer hardware (hardware), open source and digital infrastructures, including in the podcast À la French, alongside **Jean-Baptiste Kempf** and **Mehdi Medjaoui.**
Without this connection, this interview probably would not have taken place. He deserves to be thanked from the beginning of this story.

The appointment is made. The day of the interview arrives. **And of course, it’s not going to go quite as planned.**

As is the case now, I use Visio / Meet, the LaSuite digital video conferencing tool, installed on my own server via the YunoHost package. I am connected on time. Thierry too. Video conferencing is not working. I see it connected, but no sound, no image. On the other hand,

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same problem.

It was the first time that Visio had failed in my home. Usually, I'm pretty entitled to the "wow" effect and I'm usually pretty proud of it. Installing a sovereign solution, hosting it yourself, inviting someone on it and seeing that everything works: it's exactly the kind of little moment that makes you want to continue testing, installing, documenting.

This time, the wow effect took another turn.

After the interview, I tried to understand what had happened. It seems that not all the necessary ports were open enough to ensure the proper functioning of LiveKit and the WebRTC part in all cases. It is now corrected. I also created a ticket from LaSuite's Meet package to ask maintainers to add this information for future users who would like to test or deploy this solution.

In short, very concrete first lesson in digital sovereignty: we had to switch to Microsoft Teams.

I have to admit that it did not please me. Not by posture. Simply because the purpose of an alternative solution is precisely to prevent the technique from becoming a waste of time for the interlocutor. In this case, what has been lacking is not necessarily the quality of the project, but a sufficiently explicit documentation to avoid this type of blockage.

Next time, normally, I'll be ready.

This little incident brought us directly to the heart of the matter. Thierry rightly pointed out to me that Microsoft's strength is also based on the accumulated experience, the immense number of users and the continuous rise of problems with each solution launch. Bugs exist everywhere. The difference is often played in the ability to detect, document and correct them quickly.

In open source, this mechanism also exists. It does not always work in the same way, nor with the same means. It all depends on the project, the community, the team, the maturity of the ecosystem. In some cases, as I was able to test with grommuniogrommunio, corrections can happen very quickly, sometimes during the day. In other cases, the path is slower, more artisanal, more dependent on user feedback.

It is also this, digital sovereignty: accept that independence is not only an ideal, but a practice. It involves trial, errors, documentation, patience, feedback, corrections and sometimes some videoconferences that end on Teams when we would have preferred to do the reverse demonstration.

A sentence worked on me

We then returned to SiPearl: during our first exchange, during the evening À la French, Thierry Lelégard had already told me something that had appealed to me: **a project like SiPearl can not be done in total autarky.** According **to** him, **it takes at least three continents to make such a project a reality**.

It came from a professional on the subject, someone who knows intimately the stakes of security, processors, sovereignty and industrial chains. I could hardly sweep this remark with a backhand. However, she came to touch some of my beliefs. I tended to think that strategic autonomy was to do everything again at home, without depending on other continents.

Factually, this is not the case.

Thierry then helped me to move the question. Sovereignty does not necessarily mean producing everything alone, in a corner, closing the doors. It can also mean knowing the chain, mastering critical choices, reducing the most dangerous dependencies, organizing interdependencies and preventing an outside actor from deciding alone our ability to calculate, simulate, secure or innovate. To popularize, he gave me an image: that of a cooperative.
In an agricultural cooperative, machines can be shared. Farmers keep their autonomy, but they pool certain equipment, certain know-how, certain investments. In processors and chips, we find a comparable logic, on another scale: different actors, located in several countries, participate in a common value chain.

What does this have to do with a European processor?

The manufacture of a very high-level processor is based on several layers. First there is **ASML**, a Dutch company that manufactures the most advanced lithography and photolithography

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machines, which are essential for the production of the most complex chips. These machines are then used by fondeurssmelters **like** TSMC in Taiwan.

Taiwan did not become central by chance. The country has accumulated nearly half a century of industrial experience in semiconductors, from the first integrated circuit lines in the late 1970's to the current mastery of the most advanced processes. This experience cannot be improvised. She doesn't copy in a few months. It is based on generations of engineers, factories, suppliers, industrial habits, training, production culture.

Of course, the costs also play. Producing in Taiwan can be cheaper than producing in Europe or the United States. However, focusing the debate solely on cost would be a mistake. The real difficulty is the depth of the ecosystem. In this area, **industrial experience counts as much as financial investment**.

And the financial investment, too, gives vertigo: to obtain the latest technologies, the construction of a factory of advanced semiconductors, often exceeds 20 billion dollars. As you can imagine, this is not a budget line that is added between two meetings.

The United States itself has experienced this with TSMC in Arizona. The initial project, announced in 2020, provided for 12 billion dollars of investment. It was then integrated into a much broader movement of American industrial relocation. But the difficulties have been numerous: lack of skilled labour, delays, higher costs, tensions with the unions, need to bring in Taiwanese experts to install the equipment and train local teams.

There have even been tensions around visas and the use of specialists from Taiwan for operations without local equivalent. In 2024, about 2 200 people were working on the site, a very large part of which came from Taiwan. According to some estimates, almost half of the staff were deployed from the island.

In other words, even the United States, with its financial, political and technological power, does not re-establish in a few years what Taiwan has taken decades to build.

This does not mean that Europe should give up. Rather, it means that it must move forward in stages. Understanding the chain. Control some of the bricks. Reduce the most sensitive dependencies. Accumulating experience. **And avoid confusing digital sovereignty with fantasy of autarky.**

Another layer of this chain is in the United States: electronic design tools, often called EDA, for Electronic Design Automation.
These software are used to design, verify and analyze complex electronic systems: integrated circuits, electronic boards, assemblies, chips, interconnections. They are used in semiconductors, automotive, aeronautics, telecommunications, consumer electronics. Without these tools, designing a modern processor becomes totally impossible.

Here again, the market is dominated by a small number of players: Cadence Design Systems, SynopsysSynopsys and Mentor Graphics, which became Siemens EDA after its acquisition by the German Siemens in 2016. The shade is interesting, but it must be taken with caution. On the economic front, Mentor Graphics is well owned by a German group. But in terms of sovereignty, history is less obvious. The company remains deeply linked to its U.S. roots, its teams, its technologies, its legal environment and the industrial ecosystem in which it has developed.

These issues are complex, because the notion of sovereignty is not limited solely to the nationality of a shareholder. It is played out in a mixture of economic ties, technical dependencies, applicable law, location of skills and balance of power. In the event of conflict or geopolitical tension, it is often these power relations that end up weighing the heaviest.

The recent example of U.S. restrictions on EDA tools for China shows this: even Siemens EDA, which is part of a German group, has been affected by U.S. decisions on chip design software. In other words, the acquisition of Mentor Graphics by Siemens brings a European dimension. But it is not enough, on its own, to remove the American dependencies that still structure part of this industry.

This software dependency is less visible than ASML factories or machines. Yet it is essential. Even in the hardware field, the software always comes back through the window. Designing a chip is not just about drawing a physical object. It is manipulating layers of modeling, simulation, validation, verification, with extremely mature tools.

Open source already exists in this field, with projects like **OpenROAD**, **LibreLane** (formerly OpenLane), Yosys, Magic or KLayout. These tools are important because they democratize part of the chip design, allow you to learn, prototype and work on more accessible circuits. But we are not in the same situation as in conventional software, where open source ended up

producing major industrial references.
In the field of EDA, open tools are still very far behind for the most advanced industrial uses. They are especially suitable for smaller circuits or more mature manufacturing processes, precisely those that are already better known to produce in European factories.

The leap to very high performance processors is of a different nature. It involves years of development, maintenance, validation, and for the most advanced processors, industrial flows still remain largely backed by the large proprietary tools of the EDA. In particular Cadence, Synopsys and Siemens EDA, because access to the PDKs of the smelters, i.e. the technical kits that precisely describe the rules of manufacture of a chip for a given factory (for Process Design Kit, i.e. all the technical information to draw and provide viable circuits on the chosen process, with the characteristics of the layers, the widths, thicknesses and the spaces allowed. This information depends on each factory/smelter), the verification, the *sign-off*, in other words the final validation before manufacture: a series of controls that makes it possible to ensure that the drawing of the chip respects the industrial constraints of the founder, that it corresponds to the planned scheme, that it can be produced correctly and that it has a good chance of operating once out of the factory. **Industrial validation remains one of the extremely critical steps**.
This is not to say that the situation will remain frozen and that open source has no place in this industry. But if Europe wants to move quickly on very high-performance processors, it must deal, initially, with this reality.

To go further, I have grouped the whole of my watch: sources, feedback and resources, in a folder accessible online from Flus.

This *global cooperative* therefore works with European, Taiwanese, American, sometimes Japanese or Korean actors. It is based on interdependencies. These interdependencies are not always comfortable, but they are now structuring the global semiconductor industry.

There is, however, a major counter-example: China.

The Chinese have been gradually excluded from some technologies, including U.S. restrictions on advanced semiconductors, production equipment and design tools. What was first and foremost a catch-up strategy became, for Beijing, an industrial survival strategy.

This is what makes the Chinese case interesting. China has not embarked on a form of autarky by simple ideological preference. It was pushed by American pressure. The sanctions have accelerated a desire for self-sufficiency. As summarized by **La Tribune** in a very telling title: *Semiconductors: despite the sanctions, China holds the course and dreams of self-sufficiency*.

The subject is exciting, but Thierry's time is running out. So I have to go back to the course of my questions.

If this world functions as a great international cooperative, why SiPearl? Besides, what is SiPearlSiPearl? And how did this company manage to go so fast on such a complex subject?

SiPearl is a French semiconductor company that designs European microprocessors for supercomputers, artificial intelligence, data centers and, now, certain defense and security uses. Its central product is Rhea1, a processor designed in Europe, based on the Arm architecture, designed to equip very powerful computing machines such as the European supercomputer **JUPITER**.

SiPearl is not making her own fleas. She designs them and then has them produced by TSMC in Taiwan. The idea is quite simple to understand, even if its realization is extremely complex: today, much of the global computing power depends on American or Asian technologies. SiPearl seeks to give Europe a critical brick that it lacks: a very high-performance general processor. The one who manages the calculations, dialogues with memory, AI accelerators, GPUs and spins major scientific or industrial codes.

Specifically, SiPearl develops CPUs. In a way, **cross-sectional intelligences**, initially intended for calculation servers. Its first large processor, Rhea1, contains 80 Arm Neoverse V1 cores, **very** fast HBM memory, DDR5 interfaces and many PCIe Gen5 lines to engage with accelerators, including GPUs.



For the technical characteristics, these are those displayed by SiPearl. I'm not going to pretend here to be able to say, alone, whether it's powerful or not. That would be dishonest on my

part. On the other hand, according to the echoes of Steeve Morin, and in the light of the specialized press articles that I have been able to consult, **the product seems solid. The feedback is very positive. We obviously do not have to blush.**

The company insists on three axes:

- **performance,**
- **energy sobriety**
- **technological sovereignty**.

It is also important not to confuse SiPearl with Nvidia. This American multinational company dominates mainly **the GPUs**, which have become essential for AI. Instead, SiPearl is working on the sovereign CPU, intended to integrate into hybrid supercomputers, with GPUs, AI accelerators or other components. Its ambition is therefore not to replace the entire global computing chain. It is to make Europe less dependent on a strategic brick.



SiPearl is also preparing **Athena1,** a variation of Rhea1 designed for more sensitive uses: defense, aeronautics, administrations, private data centers, secure communications, cryptography, tactical networks, cyber defense or local data processing. Its commercialization is announced for the second half of 2027.

Where does SiPearl come from?

SiPearl was officially born in June 2019, under **the** leadership of , to industrialize the work of the **European Processor Initiative**, the EPI. This European programme aims to maintain and develop in Europe high-end processor design skills for intensive computing.

The operational launch of SiPearl comes in January 2020, with a Horizon **2020** European funding of 7.4 million euros. The company is therefore part of a hybrid logic from the outset: a private company, but born in the wake of a strategic European program.

This is an important point to understand SiPearl. It is not a classic startup that then discovers a public market. It is a company built from the outset around a European need for sovereignty in intensive computing.

Its recent history can be read in four stages:

- Between 2019 and 2020, it is the birth and the technological choice. SiPearl is created to make the European processor from the EPI a reality. She obtained a strategic Arm Neoverse V1 license in 2020.
- Between 2021 and 2023, it is industrial structuring. The company opens a research and development center in Barcelona, close to the Barcelona Supercomputing Center, and then raises 90 million euros.
- Between 2023 and 2025, it is strategic validation. Rhea1 is chosen for JUPITER, the first European exascale supercomputer. A new fundraising of 130 million euros is carried out in 2025, with the arrival of Cathay Venture, Taiwanese investor.
- Between 2026 and 2027, it is the transition to industrialization. SiPearl press releases indicate that **Rhea1 was lit for functional evaluation in May 2026, with a commercial release targeted at the end** of **2026**. Athena1 is then to target defense and security markets from 2027.

What about the role of Germany?

Now is the time to return to Markus' questions about Germany.
One of them was about Germany's role in this context. Another on the possible comparison with **Airbus**.
The answer is nuanced: Germany does not play the same role in SiPearl as in Airbus. The comparison has its limitations. In the teams and the board of directors of SiPearl, we find European and international profiles: French, Spanish, Italian, Swedish, British, Taiwanese, American. It cannot be said that the assembly resembles that of Airbus, with a structuring Franco-German balance. Germany, on the other hand, plays a major role through JUPITER. This supercomputer, operated by the Jülich Research Center, is one of the great drivers of this story. It has helped to give a concrete purpose to the European Processor Initiative programme: to have a European supercomputer capable of integrating, at least in part, a European processor like Rhea1.

It is therefore not an Airbus of chips in the traditional institutional and industrial sense. But it is a European adventure. An adventure where Germany occupies a decisive place through use, computational infrastructure and strategic validation.

There remains my question of departure, the one on which I insisted: **if this system of global**

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cooperative is not in itself a danger, why launch a program like SiPearl?

The answer comes from a broader observation: without processors, without supercomputers, without cloud, without design tools and without foundries, Europe depends on other powers to calculate, simulate, drive AI, secure its infrastructure and run part of its economy.

The European Processor Initiative clearly shows its mission: *to regain European independence in processor technologies for high-performance computing, with the objective of bringing out a European exascale machine based on European* bricks.

In other words, Europe wanted to avoid remaining only a client of American or Asian processors for its supercomputers. The intensive calculation is used for weather, climate, nuclear, defense, industry, AI, medical or energy simulations. **Anyone who does not master part of this chain depends on the technical, commercial and political choices of others**.

The fear of the “kill switch”

Risk is not necessarily a secret function hidden in a chip. The real modern kill switch can be legal, commercial, software or geopolitics: suspension of service, stop of updates, license cut, export restriction, conditioned access to an infrastructure, dependence on foreign maintenance.

It’s less spectacular than a spy movie script, but often more realistic.

The question of backdoors, too, is not only fantasy. There are documented facts. The Snowden revelations showed that U.S. network equipment destined for overseas had been intercepted and modified by the NSA before delivery. Routers and servers were opened, equipped, and then returned to their recipients.

The Crypto AG case is another major example. This Swiss company sold encryption machines to many states. It was actually controlled underhand by the CIA and German services, allowing the listening of supposedly secure communications in more than 120 countries. One of the models, the H-460, was even directly built by the NSA.

Another example with the Dual_EC_DRBG case: a controversial random number generator. Many experts have considered that it contains a backdoor designed by the NSA, and the Snowden documents have reinforced this reading.

On Intel or AMD CPUs, however, caution is still needed. There are serious concerns about opaque components like Intel Management Engine. 01net described it as a *computer in* the , with very high privileges, opaque, with access to memory and network, difficult to deactivate. Critical vulnerabilities have also been discovered in this component.

But this is not public evidence of a backdoor of the NSA in all Intel or AMD processors. In 2024, Chinese accusations claimed that Intel would integrate backdoors of the NSA into its CPUs through the Management Engine. However, no strong public technical evidence was presented to support these accusations. In this area, caution is essential, because cyber warfare is also a war of narratives and propaganda.

SiPearl is not a project born by chance. The company is, in a way, the *“industrial* child” of a broader European concern: dependence on processors, supercomputers, design tools and foreign infrastructure places Europe in a strategic position of vulnerability.

The PPE responds to several concrete fears:

- depend on US or Asian processors for European supercomputers
- not be able to audit or control critical components used in research, defense, AI or energy
- suffer export restrictions such as those that the United States already uses in the tech war against China
- discover that the modern kill switch goes less by a “secret button” than by licenses, updates, cloud, maintenance or extraterritorial right
- relive, in another form, the precedents related to intercepted equipment, weakened encryption, Crypto AG or Dual_EC_DRBG.

Europe has not launched the European Processor Initiative to maintain the illusion of autonomous technological power. It did this because processors, supercomputers and computing infrastructures have become technological power instruments.

In a world where digital services can be cut, where updates may depend on foreign political decisions, where network equipment has already been intercepted and modified by intelligence services, **critical brick control is no longer an industrial luxury. This is a condition of digital sovereignty.**

This is where I really became aware of the importance of SiPearl, but also of the exact title of Thierry Lelégard: "Security Architecture": Architect in System Security.

Security is not an end-of-chain layer in a project of this size. It crosses all architecture and concerns design, industrial choices, dependencies, components, software, uses, customers, markets, states, alliances.

The interview with Thierry was rich. I would have gladly continued this exchange for hours. But at some point, you have to know how to let go of the cluster to your interlocutor, even when he still has a lot of exciting things to say.

I finished my interview with two simple questions:

- **Which competitor can SiPearl be compared to?**
  Answer : Intel.

- **Could tomorrow SiPearl equip European data centers, apart from supercomputers?**
  Answer : yes.

So I started to imagine that one day, perhaps, a SiPearl processor could end up in one of my servers. It is only a personal assumption. I didn't have time to ask the question in detail. But the idea amused me. And, in fact, she also delighted me a little.

In concluding this interview, I was especially told one thing: what SiPearl managed to do in a few years forces respect.

That's my opinion, of course, but when you look at the facts, it's founded. The company was created in 2019, operationally launched in 2020, and it has already created a high-performance European processor, designed to equip leading supercomputers. All this in an industrial sector of extreme complexity, with fundraising never easy to realize, global dependency chains, a European bureaucracy rarely known for its supersonic speed, and a subject where error is very expensive.

SiPearl remains an actor in this major global semiconductor cooperative. She doesn't make everything. It does not replace ASML, TSMC, Cadence, Synopsys, Siemens EDA, Nvidia or the entire global ecosystem. But it brings a European brick where Europe was missing one.

And that is already a lot.

In just over six operational years, this company does not have to blush. It shows once again that impossible is not French, even when the file goes through Brussels, Taiwan, the United States, Germany, Arm, EDA tools, supercomputers, billions of investment and a good dose of industrial patience.

Finally, I would like to thank again Steeve Morin, for having made this exchange possible and to prove, through his career and his speeches, that another vision of tech can exist.

> I have it in my hand and you don't, the SiPearl Rhea 1 pic.twitter.com/xn7MexUD20
>
> — Steeve Morin (@steeve) June 2, 2026

Thank you also to Thierry Lelégard for his patience, his pedagogy and his ability to explain topics of extreme complexity to someone who, I would be happy to remind you, is neither a technician, nor a developer, nor an engineer, let alone the serail.

The goal of this article is to allow the general public to better understand what SiPearl is, why this project matters, and why digital sovereignty is not limited to software, clouds or online services.

It is also played here: in processors, architectures, machines, industrial chains, international cooperations and security choices.

Coming out of this reading, I hope that you will no longer look at a European processor as a simple technical object, but as a very concrete piece of our future autonomy.

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